Through the Price Waterhouse-Looking Glass: Dominance and Oppression Revealed by CLOAR, CAMERON
Through the Price Waterhouse-Looking
Glass: Dominance and Oppression
Revealed
By CAMERON CLOAR*
[I] t should be permissible for the General Assembly to find as a
legislative fact that homosexual sodomy leads to other deviate prac-
tices such as sado-masochism, group orgies, or transvestism, to
name only a few. Homosexual sodomy is often practiced outside
the home such as in public parks, restrooms, "gay baths," and "gay
bars" and is marked by the multiplicity and anonymity of sexual
partners, a disproportionate involvement with adolescents, and, in-
deed, a possible relationship to crimes of violence.1
Introduction
TAKEN FROM THE STATE of Georgia's brief in Bowers v. Hardwick,2
this passage reflects how many people view homosexual behavior in
today's society.3 Those who love people of their own sex encounter
constant hatred, exclusion, and subordination. 4 Gay men and lesbians
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1. Brief of Petitioner Michael J. Bowers, Attorney Gen. of Ga. at 36-38, Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 45-140) (footnotes omitted).
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Justice
White concluded: "No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one
hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated." Id. at 191.
3. SeeJames Allon Garland, The Low Road to Violence: Governmental Discrimination as a
Catalyst for Pandemic Hate Crime, 10 LAw & SEXUALITY 1, 3-4 (2001) (noting that antigay
sentiment still exists in states that no longer have laws prohibiting homosexual intimacy).
4. See Michael Joseph Gross, Gay is the New Black?, ADVOCATE, Dec. 16, 2008, at 30
("At present[,] [homosexuals] are the most socially acceptable targets for the kind of cas-
ual hatred that American society once approved for habitual use against black people. Gay
is the dark pit where our society lets people throw their fears about what's wrong with the
world.").
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are too often defined by, and obsessed with, sexual activity.5 They are
commonly considered promiscuous, predatory, generally unable to
form monogamous relationships, and antithetical to the idealized no-
tion of family.6 Perhaps most viciously, gay men in particular are por-
trayed as child molesters. 7 Though Bowers was eventually overturned,8
homosexual persecution continues.9
Notably, many states turn their backs on true equality by exclud-
ing gay men and lesbians from the institution of marriage and adopt-
ing children. 10 Equally as suspect, the United States government
excludes gay men from donating blood.1' Society proclaims same-sex
5. See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protections for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 514
(1992) (noting the belief that "gay people experience sexual activity differently than non-
gays," and that "[glay sexuality, according to this common understanding, is all encom-
passing, obsessive, and completely divorced from love, long-term relationships, and family
structure").
6. ALLAN BERUBE, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN
WORLD WAR II, at 118 (1990) (reporting the popular World War II era belief that
homophiles were "'perverts' obsessed with sex who could not love and were not worth
loving"); see also WARREN J. BLUMENFELD & DIANE RAYMOND, LOOKING AT GAY AND LESBIAN
LIFE 376 (1988) (commenting that gay bars are often criticized "as dens of hedonism and
unbridled sexuality"); see also Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1320
n.4 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that the university argued that a gay student group designed to
provide information and exchange of ideas was likely to "incite, promote and result" in
sexual activity).
7. Fajer, supra note 5, at 541 ("This stereotype exists despite evidence that the vast
majority of child abuse incidents involve men abusing girls, and that many men who abuse
boys self-identify as heterosexual or have no interest in adult males.").
8. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) ("Bowers was not correct when it was
decided .... is not correct today[,] . . . and now is overruled.").
9. SeeJesse McKinley & Laura Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2008, at Al (reporting that voters in Arizona, California, and Florida passed initia-
tives to ban same-sex marriage); see also Dan Savage, Anti-Gay, Anti-Family, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2008, at A31 (reporting that Arkansas voters passed a state initiative to ban gay men and
lesbians from adopting children).
10. The United States Supreme Court determined that the promise of true equality is
breached by the act of separation, which serves no other purpose than to exclude and
isolate. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
11. The document that gave official imprimatur to the lifetime exclusion of sexually
active gay male blood was issued by the Food and Drug Administration in 1992. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PRE-
VENTION OF HuMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS (HIV) TRANSMISSION BY BLOOD AND BLOOD
PRODUCTS 3 (1992), available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/bldmem/hiv042392.pdf. This
policy was "clearly intended to discriminate against gay and bisexual men... because the
class was considered to be promiscuous." Michael Christian Belli, The Constitutionality of the
"Men Who Have Sex With Men"Blood Donor Exclusion Policy, 4J.L. Soc'v 315, 368 (2003). This
policy is consistent with 21 C.F.R. § 640.3(a)-(c) (2006), which regulates donor suitability,
and 21 C.F.R. § 640.120 (2008), which grants the FDA the authority to alter regulations
regarding blood, blood components, and blood products.
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couples and homosexual lifestyles inferior to those of heterosexuals.
These laws echo rhetoric traditionally used by the majority to
subordinate minority groups12 and to justify officially declaring gay
men and lesbians unworthy based on stereotypes. As a practical mat-
ter, these social laws and policies place homosexuals in a double
bind1 3 by punishing their promiscuity while preventing their partici-
pation in stable, long-term relationships. This double bind thus illus-
trates a broader social system of domination and hierarchy along lines
of sexuality.
Gay men and lesbians are not, however, the only class of persons
subject to marginalization through an unfair "Catch 22."14 For in-
stance, women professionals tend to experience negative reactions
when they depart from traditional feminine stereotypes and adopt
masculine authoritative work styles, under a perception that such be-
havior is deviant and unbecoming. t 5 The United States Supreme
Court, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,16 first recognized such arbitrary
double binds placed on women through gender stereotypes and the
resultant subordination. 17 This Comment employs Price Waterhouse as a
"Looking Glass," to identify similar double binds that suggest oppres-
sion. While analyzing all arguments for the repeal of such oppressive
12. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (concluding that if the black
race is inferior to the white race, the Constitution cannot put them in the same plane);
Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869) (holding that the state anti-miscegenation statute
prevents the mixing of races that produced deplorable results); Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d
749, 755-56 (Va. 1955) (holding that anti-miscegenation statutes preserve the racial integ-
rity of Virginia citizens).
13. One scholar defines a double bind as a no-win situation in which a person or class
of people are placed. See KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, BEYOND THE DOUBLE BIND 3 (1995).
Female military personnel, for example, do not often report sexual harassment for fear
that their peers may label them as lesbians, and that they may face discharge from the
service under the gay military ban. Id. at 4. Alternatively, they will submit to the unwanted
heterosexual activity simply to prove their heterosexuality. Id.
14. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (using the term "Catch
22" to describe the unlawful behavior of defendant Price Waterhouse). The Oxford En-
glish Dictionary defines "Catch 22" as "a circumstance that presents a dilemma because of
mutually conflicting or dependent conditions." OXFORD ENGLISH DicTONARY 146 (1999).
The term was postulated in Joseph Heller's novel Catch-22. Id.
15. See JAMIESON, supra note 13, at 4 (noting that the history of Western culture is
populated with evidence of traps for women). Racial minorities also fall victim to unfair
double binds. In universities, for instance, a lack of diversity creates a racial Catch 22 where
the "token" black students face competing demands to become more representative of
"their race" and also more assimilating into the dominant race. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu
Gulati, What Exactly is Racial Diversity?, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1149, 1157-58 (2003).
16. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Another holding of the Court, not addressed in this Com-
ment, was overruled in part by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
17. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
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laws and policies is beyond the scope of this Comment, I extend a Price
Waterhouse-Looking Glass to argue that the laws examined here per-
petuate a similar system of human hierarchy that privileges heterosex-
uality and the heterosexual relationship.' 8 Not surprisingly, such a
societal structure correspondingly condemns the same-sex intimate
and familial relationship.
I explicate my thesis in two parts. Part I recounts the now classic
narrative of Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse. Specifically, Part I ana-
lyzes the Court's identification of the classic double bind on women
and its deconstruction that revealed a system of gender stratification
through unfair female stereotypes. Viewing through the Price
Waterhouse-Looking Glass, Part II documents another Catch 22, drawn
from unfair stereotypes, which establishes a similar social system of
superiority and subordination of gay men and lesbians. I conclude
that though the Court denounced the gender stratification in Price
Waterhouse, gay men and lesbians continue to experience subordina-
tion as second-class individuals in a heterosexist society. And, as
taught through the equivalent deconstruction of race and gender
domination, I stress that society will never experience true freedom
until we are also free from oppression on the basis of sexual
orientation.
I. Defining the Price Waterhouse-Looking Glass: The Story of
Ann Hopkins
After nearly four decades since society recognized the harmful
effects of sex-based discrimination,' 9 the overriding gender issue in
professional workplaces is persistent stereotypes. 20 For instance,
women who are too passive are dismissed while women who are too
aggressive are disliked.21 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins provides the
18. Heterosexism is defined as the pervasive cultural presumption of heterosexual
relationships and the corresponding condemnation of homosexual familial and communi-
tarian relations. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L.
REv. 187, 195 (1988).
19. See ABIGAIL C. SAGUY, WHAT IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT? FROM CAPITOL HILL TO THE
SORBONNE 29 (2003) (noting that legal feminists began to argue in the late 1970s that
sexual harassment constituted a form of sex discrimination).
20. See HOLLY ENGLISH, GENDER ON TRIAL: SEXUAL STEREOTYPES AND WORK/LIFE BAL-
ANCE IN THE LEGAL WORKPLACE 6 (2003).
21. Id. ("[P]eople still assume that women aren't as competent as men. Speculation
abounds that successful women 'sleep their way to the top' rather than advancing due to
merit, whereas men have to protect themselves from assumptions that they are potential
sexual predators who will harass the women they supervise.").
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Court's first recognition of an unfair Catch 22 used to solidify arbi-
trary gender stereotypes against women.
The Price Waterhouse narrative defines the classic double bind that
one scholar described as particularly severe.2 2 Ann Hopkins was the
only female nominee for partnership at Price Waterhouse, a large pro-
fessional services firm, among a considerable field of eighty-eight. 23
Her record at the firm was exceptional: Hopkins excelled at generat-
ing new business and was described as "'an outstanding professional'
who had a 'deft touch,' a 'strong character, independence and integ-
rity.'- 24 She was not, however, elevated to partner.25 Hopkins sued the
firm under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging gender
discrimination. 26
Interestingly, the negative comments on Hopkins's partnership
review suggest her masculine qualities doomed her partnership
chances at Price Waterhouse. One partner, for example, advised Hop-
kins to "[w]alk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up and jewelry [and] have [her] hair styled."27
Some suggested she enroll in "a course at charm school," 28 and others
noted that she was "macho" and "overcompensated for being a wo-
man."29 Still more complained of her use of profanity, although one
admitted noticing her swearing "[]ust because it's a lady using foul
22. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 916 (2002). Professor Yoshino posits
a similar judicial treatment of pregnancy and other "covering" activities, including groom-
ing and homosexual sodomy. Id. Yoshino defines covering as an individual's attempt to
keep their stigmatized trait from looming large. Id. at 772. Yoshino, therefore, suggests that
women are similarly situated to homosexuals and racial minorities. Id. at 916.
23. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 233 (1989). At the time Ann Hopkins
was up for partnership, only 7 of the 662 partners at the firm were women. Id.
24. Id. at 234. Hopkins's clients agreed and described her as "extremely competent,
intelligent, strong and forthright, very productive, energetic and creative." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
25. Id. at 233. Of the eighty-eight candidates, forty-seven were elevated to partner,
twenty-one were rejected, and twenty-including Hopkins-were to be reconsidered the
following year. Id. Though Hopkins was not elevated to partner, thirteen of the thirty-two
partners submitted favorable reviews on her bid. Id. Three partners recommended ber bid
be placed on hold, eight did not have an informed opinion, and eight partners moved to
deny her bid for partner. Id.
26. Id. at 232.
27. ANN BRANIGAR HOPKINS, So ORDERED: MAKING PARTNER THE HARD WAY 148
(1996).
28. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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language."30 At first glance, Price Waterhouse expected female part-
ners to come across as soft and effeminate.31
Or did they? Hopkins's narrative reveals that she was also re-
stricted from acting in accordance with female stereotypes in her pro-
fessional life. At her first employer, Deloitte & Touche ("Deloitte"),
Hopkins became pregnant with her first child.32 Hopkins believed
childbirth, a medical procedure, would keep her out of work for a few
weeks.33 Deloitte, however, believed Hopkins would quit the firm, la-
beling her pregnancy a "professional crisis."3 4 Later, while working for
Price Waterhouse, Hopkins was similarly criticized for occasionally
bringing her children to work.3 5 Hopkins was expected to conform to
common feminine behavior, but her employers simultaneously de-
manded she hide her role as a mother.
In Price Waterhouse, feminine stereotypes were used to create an
intolerable and unfair double bind.36 Susan Fiske, a psychologist and
expert witness for Hopkins, explained the stereotype: "The overall
stereotype for feminine behavior is to be socially concerned and un-
derstanding, soft and tender, and the overall stereotype for a man, all
other things being equal, is that [he] will be competitive, ambitious,
aggressive, independent, and active."3 7 Because stereotypical male
traits are valued at the workplace, women are bound in a conflict "be-
tween the assertiveness and aggressiveness required to get the job
done and the image required to fit the female stereotype."38
Though no formal company rule excluded Hopkins from part-
nership because she was a woman, the Court held the firm illegally
discriminated on the basis of sex.39 The Court thus prohibited sex
30. HOPKINS, supra note 27, at 209.
31. Id. at xiii (noting that previous female partner candidates were criticized for act-
ing like boys or feminists).
32. Id. at 43.
33. Id. at 44.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 225.
36. Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as "Catch 22". Why Identity Performance De-
mands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REv. 299, 318-19 (2005) (arguing that
the demand to be aggressive or the demand to act according to one's gender are accept-
able alone, but are unacceptable when imposed at the same time).
37. HoPKINS, supra note 27, at 234.
38. Id. at 236; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (citing
the demands placed on Hopkins by the dominant male establishment); Yoshino, supra
note 22, at 916-17 ("Fiske maintained that because stereotypically male traits are valued in
many work environments, women who seek to succeed in such environments are placed in
a double bind." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
39. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
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stereotyping: " [W] e are beyond the day when an employer could eval-
uate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereo-
type associated with their group .... "40 In addition, the Court opined
that Price Waterhouse placed Hopkins, and all women, in an "intoler-
able and impermissible [C]atch 22: out of ajob if they behave aggres-
sively and out of a job if they do not."'41 Thus, Price Waterhouse held
that the treatment of Hopkins was illegal, because (1) it was based on
sex stereotypes; and (2) it placed her in a Catch 22.42
Since the Court's ruling, scholars have commented that "the
double bind is a strategy perennially used by those with power against
those without. '43 Evidence shows that, historically, women are usually
the target and experience devastating results.44 Scholars argue that
men's departures from gender norms are accepted, while women's
differences are correspondingly devalued.45 Women often internalize
the devaluation of their feminine traits, view themselves less deserving
of rewards for the same performance as men, and are less likely to
view themselves as leaders. 46 This, in turn, produces low self-esteem
and additional stress within women's personal and professional lives. 47
According to one scholar, the conflict created by the Catch 22 affects
women's mental health because it becomes a constant reminder of
the inequality between men and women. 48
Price Waterhouse remains a landmark decision for the gains
achieved by formal recognition of the Catch 22. For the first time, the
Court recognized that women consistently face contradictory identity
performance demands by the dominant male establishment.49
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Yoshino, supra note 22, at 917 (discussing the two theories under which the Court
found Price Waterhouse's treatment of Hopkins illegal).
43. JAMIESON, supra note 13, at 5.
44. Id.; see also Andrea Macerollo, The Power of Masculinity in the Legal Profession: Women
Lawyers and Identity Formation, 25 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SoC. IssUEs 121, 137 (2008).
45. Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1030, 1046 (1992) (noting
that women and men use different lawyering styles at different times, but that women are
perceived as using a female style when they depart from traditional patterns of advocacy).
46. See Macerollo, supra note 44, at 137.
47. See id. at 133 (concluding that social messages of gender conformity create undue
stress and uncertainty for women).
48. See Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 500 (1990). Professor Radford explains that women who pursue ca-
reers face a constant reminder that they chose a "different" path than most women. Id. at
500-01. These women are deemed "tokens" and often experience alienation or isolation
from colleagues and are pressured into acting in stereotypical ways. Id.
49. See generally Ramachandran, supra note 36, at 313-14 (noting that women experi-
ence gender performance requirements that are a form of negative class subordination).
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Though many partners at Price Waterhouse did not articulate an ani-
mus toward women, they did object to a certain type of woman. 50 That
is, Ann Hopkins posed a formidable threat to the classic gender script.
Recognition of this Catch 22 made courts and others attempting to
end discrimination cognizant that the demand to perform gender-ap-
propriately is nothing more than gender subordination. 51 At its core,
the Price Waterhouse decision recognized that double binds based on
unfair stereotypes were used to reinforce the secondary status of wo-
men. It legitimized the notion that women are equal, rather than sub-
servient to men. The greater acceptance of this concept has, in turn,
validated and enforced gender equality.
Using Price Waterhouse as a Looking Glass offers useful insight into
the marginalization of similarly situated minority groups, specifically
gay men and lesbians. 52 Professional women challenge the notion that
social traits, like dominance and nurturance, are naturally linked to
one sex or the other. Homosexuals similarly challenge the notion that
heterosexuality is a natural sexual quality; they reject the social institu-
tions of family that are premised on gender inequality and differ-
ence. 53 They, like Ann Hopkins, do not fit.
II. Applying the Price Waterhouse-Looking Glass:
Heterosexism and Subordination Revealed Through
Bans on Marriage, Adoption, and Blood
Donation
A. Marriage
Same-sex marriage, for many gay men and lesbians, illustrates an
extreme mechanism of subordination. The Supreme Court of the
United States has repeatedly recognized the importance of the emo-
tional and symbolic nature of marriage. 54 It is a fundamental institu-
50. Yoshino, supra note 22, at 911 ("[M]any partners unwilling to articulate categori-
cal animus toward women were quite comfortable voicing objections to a certain kind of
woman."); see also id. ("This was the woman who did not perform her gender in the middle
band between hypermasculinity and hyperfemininity. Thus when Hopkins's friend and col-
league... was asked in court whether Price Waterhouse treated women fairly, she percep-
tively responded that it had treated her, as an individual woman, fairly.").
51. See Ramachandran, supra note 36, at 318.
52. See Yoshino, supra note 22, at 916.
53. See discussion infra Part IL.B (addressing homosexual adoption).
54. See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (recognizing that marriage is an "ex-
pression[ ] of emotional support and public commitment"); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 386 (1978) (stating that marriage is the "foundation of the family in our society");
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) ("[Mlarriage involves interests of basic
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tion that signifies to family, friends, the community, and the world a
moral commitment between two people and society's promise to re-
spect the sanctity of that relationship. 55 Marriage occupies a unique
space in our society, central to the formation of human relationships
for centuries. 56 The contours of the institution have dramatically
changed over time, but the core idea of marriage-the loving commit-
ment of two individuals-has not.5 7
Twenty-seven states, however, deny same-sex couples the fight to
marry.58 The breadth of states' policies on marriage varies. For in-
stance, Alaska defines marriage as between a man and a woman but
allows the possibility for alternative legal arrangements like domestic
partnerships. 59 Nebraska prohibits same-sex marriage, civil unions,
domestic partnerships, and all other like legal statuses. 60 Louisiana
and Oklahoma not only ban same-sex marriage, but also forbid the
legal incidents of marriage-specifically the benefits and protections
that accompany marital status-from being conferred on same-sex
couples.61 All told, forty-two states have laws prohibiting same-sex rela-
importance in our society."); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (discussing marriage
as a fundamental freedom); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (characteriz-
ing marriage as a basic civil right and fundamental to human existence); Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (describing marriage as "the most important relation in life").
55. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) ("Marriage is a coming to-
gether for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.").
56. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) ("Civil
marriage is at once a deeply personal commitment to another human being and a highly
public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and
family.").
57. Traditional law, for example, reinforced gender and commitment norms in mar-
riage. See Elizabeth Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Recognition of Marriage, 86 VA. L. Rv.
1901, 1904 (2000). Gender norms prescribed varying roles for each sex, while commitment
norms defined marriage as a cooperative and lifelong relationship. Id. "[T] he legal respon-
sibilities of marriage, the barriers to exit, and the substantive fault grounds for divorce
made marriage a serious business." Id. The legal framework has changed over time. Id. at
1905.
58. "Twenty-seven states have passed 'defense of marriage' amendments in the last
decade." Brodie M. Butland, The Categorical Imperative: Romer as the Groundwork for Challeng-
ing State "Defense of Marriage"Amendments, 68 OHIo ST. L.J. 1419, 1419 (2007). Among these
twenty-seven states, seventeen outlaw other similar legal relationships. Human Rights Cam-
paign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, http://www.hrc.org/documents/marriage_
prohibit 20070919.pdf (Sept. 19, 2007).
59. See Butland, supra note 58.
60. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29.
61. See Butland, supra note 58.
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tionship recognition, 62 and opponents of these unions present both
religious and secular arguments.
Though not every religion opposes same-sex marriage or same-
sex unions, 63 many religious institutions in the United States de-
nounce these relationships. 64 Christian followers ground their opposi-
tion to same-sex marriage in their belief that homosexuality is a sin 6
5
and because it "involves sex that doesn't create life." 66 Implicitly, these
arguments criticize homosexuality as unnatural, sexually immoral,
and threatening to children-all stereotypes used to vilify homosexu-
als in Bowers over twenty years ago.
Scholars divide secular arguments against same-sex marriage into
three categories: (1) the definitional argument; (2) the stamp of ap-
proval argument; and (3) the defense of marriage argument. 67 Under
the definitional argument, same-sex marriage opponents demand so-
ciety limit marriage to between a man and woman because that is how
it has always been.68 For example, in 1970 a lesbian couple seeking a
marriage license from Jefferson County, Kentucky, was formally de-
62. Stateline.org, State Policies on Same-Sex Marriage, http://archive.stateline.org/
flash-data/2007_May_31-CivilUnions/SocialPolicy.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2009) [herein-
after State Policies on Same-Sex Marriage]. On Friday, April 3, 2009, the Iowa Supreme
Court unanimously ruled its state law limiting marriage to a man and woman unconstitu-
tional. See Monica Davey, Iowa Court Clears Way for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2009, at Al. On April 7, 2009, the Vermont legislature overruled the state govenor's veto to
allow same-sex marriage. Abby Goodnough, Rejecting Veto, Vermont Backs Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at AL, A16.
63. For instance, Quakers, Unitarians, Buddhists, and Reform and Reconstructionist
Jews do not institutionally oppose same-sex marriages or unions. Mark Strasser, Same-Sex
Marriages and Civil Unions: On Meaning, Free Exercise, and Constitutional Guarantees, 33 Loy.
U. CHI. L.J. 597, 605 (2002).
64. Press Release, Pew Research Ctr., Republicans Unified, Democrats Split on Gay
Marriage: Religious Beliefs Underpin Opposition to Homosexuality 1 (Nov. 18, 2003),
available at http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-homosexuality.pdf.
65. See Leviticus 20:13 (King James) ("If a man also lie with mankind as he lieth with a
woman, both of them have committed an abomination."); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Condemnation of those practices is
firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards.").
66. See Steven Waldman, A Common Missed Conception: Why Religious People Are Against
Gay Marriage, STATE, Nov. 19, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2091413/. These religious
arguments, backed by centuries of tradition and interpretation, are found in early judicial
opinions regarding same-sex marriage. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn.
1971) ("The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the
procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis."); see
also Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
67. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR
FOR WORSE? WHAT WE'VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 21 (2006) (describing the evolu-
tion of arguments against same-sex marriage).
68. Id. at 21-22.
[Vol. 43
nied by the District Attorney because the couple represented "the
pure pursuit of hedonistic and sexual pleasure." 69 The couple sued
and the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected their constitutional argu-
ment: "[The] appellants are prevented from marrying . . . by their
incapability of entering unto a marriage as that term is defined." 70
The stamp of approval argument posits that any legislation en-
dorsing same-sex marriage encourages homosexuality by placing a
stamp of approval on unnatural conduct.71 For instance, Judge Rich-
ard Posner tolerates sexual variance, yet refuses to accept same-sex
marriage because it would condone homosexuality. 72 The most homo-
sexuals can expect, he argues, is noninterference in their relation-
ships, but not positive support or approval.73 A New York state senator
agrees: "Sexual orientation is their choice and I don't think it's our
place to force people that might have a moral opposition to it to have
to put up with it and condone it.''74
The defense of marriage argument decries same-sex marriage be-
cause it undermines the sanctity of traditional marriage and, there-
fore, results in a moral collapse. 75 During congressional consideration
of the federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), the House Judici-
69. Id. The district attorney later testified that the couple's marriage would "lead to a
breakdown in the sanctity of government," would jeopardize the country's morality, and
"could spread all over the world." Id. at 21.
70. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973). The Kentucky Supreme Court
continued: "[M]arriage has always been considered as the union of a man and a woman
and we have been presented with no authority to the contrary." Id. In 1971, the Minnesota
State Supreme Court rejected a similar case for same-sex marriage. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at
186.
71. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 67, at 25-26. Many parents love their homosexual
sons and daughters, yet oppose state recognition of same-sex marriage because they do not
approve of the homosexual lifestyle, or think that it is the best life path for their children.
Id.
72. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 311 (1992).
73. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 67, at 26.
74. Kevin Sack, Albany G.O.P. Grappling with Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993, at
L+27 (quoting John Kuhl). United States Senator Trent Lott relied on the stamp of ap-
proval argument in refusing to fund the District of Columbia's domestic partnership legis-
lation in 1993. ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 67, at 26. Parents are the main audience for
the stamp of approval argument, "who love their children and want what's best for them."
Id. "Even if 'gay is good,' they think, straight is great. Parents, their churches, their commu-
nities, and, yes, even the state ought to express this moral and lifestyle preference, espe-
cially by refusing to recognize same-sex marriages." Id.
75. ESK.RJDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 67, at 28. Defense of Marriage advocates view
marriage as an altruistic space, where adults sacrifice self-interest to commit to one another
and to raise their children. Id. at 29. They therefore believe that same-sex marriage would
devalue the institution of marriage as an altruistic space and "undermine its ability to ad-
vance the community values it has long promoted." Id.
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ary Committee concluded "civil society has an interest in maintaining
and protecting the institution of heterosexual marriage because it has
a deep and abiding interest to encourage responsible procreation and
child rearing. Simply put, government has an interest in marriage be-
cause it has an interest in children. '7 6
The Price Waterhouse-Looking Glass exposes a severe double bind
in the formal exclusion of gays and lesbians from marriage. Marriage
would theoretically counsel stability, monogamy, and commitment be-
tween same-sex partners. 77 Because marriage has a special significance
in society, the institution has a signaling effect that alters how individ-
uals within a marriage behave toward one another.78 Married couples
intuitively understand they are to be emotionally and financially sup-
portive, honest, and faithful. 79 Though couples may alter those behav-
ioral expectations, they benefit by beginning from a common
understanding of the core marital relationship, gleaned from a life-
time of observation of, and experience with, others who are married.
They therefore understand respective duties within a marriage, even if
they choose to alter them.
Marriage also affects society's behavior towards the couple.80 Be-
cause marriage is universally recognized, society treats married
couples in a manner that reflects their legal and social status.81
76. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 13 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2917.
77. See Mark Strasser, Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions: On Meaning, Free Exercise, and
Constitutional Guarantees, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 597, 603 (2002) (arguing that marriage pro-
vides stability for adults, making them happier and more productive); see also Kim Vo,
Marital Blitz Before Hearings, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 17, 2004, at 1A ("'It's different
being married. Saying those words really meant something to me.'" (quoting Kathy
Knowles)).
78. See J.M. Adams et al., The Conceptualization of Marital Commitment: An Integrative
Analysis, 72J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1177, 1177-78 (1997). Although commitment
is an important factor in many dating relationships, it tends to be more salient within
marriage because of the interpersonal, social, and legal complexity that is absent in most
dating relationships. Id. at 1177.
79. Married spouses understand that commitment reflects the degree to which they
intend to maintain their marriage. Id. Committed spouses therefore tend to better accom-
modate each other, communicate and problem solve more effectively, and consider com-
mitment to be one of the most important factors contributing to a successful marriage. Id.
80. For example, many couples remain married to avoid the disapproval of family and
friends that often accompanies a divorce. Id. at 1178.
81. See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 226 (N.J. 2006) (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (quot-
ing a litigant who stated: "When I am asked about my relationship, I want my words to
match my life, so I want to say I am married and know that my relationship with [my same-
sex partner] is immediately understood, and after that nothing more needs be ex-
plained"); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 448-49 (Cal. 2008) (recognizing that
the right to marry obligates the state to grant official recognition to the couple's relation-
ship and to protect them from certain types of improper interference by others).
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When they go into a bank and open a joint account, or check into
a hotel, or apply for a credit card or a telephone number, or jointly
attend a parent-teacher conference, or accompany a child on a
plane flight, there is no need for explanation or documentary
proof of the familial relationship.8 2
This recognition and understanding of marriage strengthens these re-
lationships. And, because couples understand marriage is a lifetime
commitment, they may be more willing to work through difficult
times, and family and friends are likely to encourage this.
8 3
The marriage of same-sex couples would seem to counsel against
unfavorable gay and lesbian stereotypes. Marriage would strengthen
the homosexual couple's relationship as it does for heterosexual
couples. As a result, same-sex partners would have fewer sexual part-
ners, thus minimizing perceived promiscuity.8 4 Under the argument's
premise, that same-sex couples are sexual deviates and more prone to
fewer long-lasting relationships, it would seem the stabilization mar-
riage provides would benefit them more than opposite-sex couples.
8 5
Without marriage, some same-sex couples might continue to engage
in many safe and unsafe relationships,8 6 and, therefore, might remain
subject to the same stereotypes.
Society thus condemns homosexuals to a life of promiscuity,
while refusing to allow gay couples to enter the civilizing institution of
marriage. As one scholar said it best: "So which is it? Do same-sex
couples get to live liyes of stability, monogamy, and commitment, or
82. Brief for Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Respondents at 44-45, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999).
83. See Goodridge v. Dep't. of Pub. Health, 798 N,E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) ("Mar-
riage... bestows enormous private and social advantages on those who choose to marry.
Civil Marriage is... a deeply personal commitment to another human being and a highly
public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and
family.").
84. SeeJustin T. Wilson, Preservationism, or the Elephant in the Room: How Opponents of
Same-Sex Marriage Deceive Us into Establishing Religion, 14 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'V 561, 663
(2007) (concluding that because marriage has stabilizing effects, the belief that allowing
same-sex marriage will decrease the number of sexually transmitted diseases is rational).
85. See Brief for Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents at 30, supra note 82 ("Being married is the only universally under-
stood way we have of expressipg the Oepth and permanence of our commitment to each
other." (internal citations omitted)).
86. See Wilson, supra note 84, at 663 ("Without marriage, same-sex couples will pre-
sumably continue to engage in both safe and unsafe sexual intercourse. Without marriage,
it is reasonable to assume that STI rates among homosexuals will remain the same or in-
crease. Without marriage, it is reasonable to assume that partners will continue to infect
one another at about the same rates, and that those individuals and couples who are
predisposed to engage in extra-relationship intercourse ... will continue to do so at about
the same rates.").
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are they to be continually shunted into the second-best category,
where the very relationship attributes they seek are the ones they are
faulted for not already possessing?"8 7 Thus, state and federal laws im-
plicitly suggest gay men and lesbians, no matter how they act, are not
morally worthy enough to enter marriage.88
Unraveling the double bind reveals irrational underlying stereo-
types of gay men and lesbians that work to oppose equal access to
marriage. States exclude homosexuals from marriage, refusing to con-
done their lifestyle because of the stereotype that gays and lesbians are
obsessed with sex and unable to maintain lasting relationships. Thus,
on the surface, the heterosexist majority seeks to prohibit same-sex
unions under a notion that society must not reward bad or unnatural
behavior. Despite advances for homosexuals in some states, all of
these arbitrary stereotypes have successfully prevented recognition of
same-sex marriage.89
Left only with arbitrary stereotypes, official homosexual exclusion
from a social institution long considered fundamental to human free-
dom and dignity can rest only on a heterosexist social hierarchy. The
Catch 22 therefore serves as a vehicle to further society's heterosexist
system of domination.90 Such institutionalized ideologies operate to
marginalize and devalue gay men and lesbians.91 Just as Price
Waterhouse revealed that Hopkins' status as a woman was deeply dis-
crediting at Deloitte and Price Waterhouse, 92 many view homosexual-
ity as deeply discrediting.93 Excluding same-sex couples from marriage
segregates gay men and lesbians from the rest of society and rein-
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. See State Policies on Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 62 (showing that in 2009,
nearly all states prohibit same-sex marriages, and only four states permit civil unions).
90. Cf JAMIESON, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing the strategic use of the double bind
against powerless women).
91. See Strasser, supra note 77, at 628 ("Same-sex marriage opponents do not even
attempt to mask their view that society must not view same-sex unions as on a par with
different-sex unions."); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet,
25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 817, 946 (1997) ("[P]ermitting gay marriages seem[s] like a recogni-
tion of complete equality, when virtual equality was all society was willing to offer or
accept.").
92. If Hopkins' status as a woman was not deeply discrediting, Hopkins would not
have felt pressure to act masculine. Neither would Deloitte have considered Hopkins's
pregnancy a "professional crisis." See HOPKINS, supra note 27, at 44.
93. Cf R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79
N.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 818 (2004) (noting that race is deeply discrediting because, "[e]ven
today[,] it continues to stand out as an unfortunate basis on which individuals or groups
are discriminated against or otherwise differentiated from others in society").
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forces stereotypes that homosexuals are "different" from-and infer-
ior to-the heterosexual majority.94
Few can dispute the importance of marriage in our culture. 95 By
denying homosexual couples "one of the basic civil rights of man, fun-
damental to our very existence,"96 state laws send a message to gay
men and lesbians that their relationships are not worthy of the highest
and most respected recognition of a committed relationship. 97 This,
in fact, discourages long-term relationships.
Our culture expects, even celebrates, formal recognition of rela-
tionships that involve a man and a woman. Our laws, however, employ
unfair stereotypes to condemn those same relationships when they in-
volve two people of the same sex. We presume that "real men are and
should be sexually attracted to women, and real women invite and
enjoy that attraction."98 As such, the heterosexual couple forms the
nucleus of our interpersonal relationships, which are both socially
supported and privileged.99 Ann Hopkins challenged societal gender
norms and, therefore, her exclusion from partnership reinforced a
male dominant hierarchy. Same-sex marriage formally rejects the no-
tion that heterosexual attraction is natural and universal; it denies the
traditional belief that stable relationships require the hierarchy of
male and female gender norms.
Hence, this heterosexist society determines that life as a hetero-
sexual couple is generally easier and more pleasant because dominant
prevailing social structures make it so. Legal exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage institutionalizes an ideology that homosexual
94. See In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004)
(holding that requiring same-sex couples to enter into the separate institution of civil un-
ions relegates them to "second-class status").
95. One recent article noted:
The most important day of your life was when you got married. It was on that day
that all your friends and all your family got together to celebrate the most impor-
tant thing in life: your happiness-your ability to make a new home, to form a
new but connected family, to find love that put everything else into perspective.
Andrew Sullivan, Why the M Word Matters to Me: Only Marriage Can Bring a Gay Person Home,
TIME, Feb. 16, 2004, § 7.
96. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that the State must extend either
marriage or civil unions to same-sex couples. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006).
Chief Justice Poritz argued that "[b]y excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage, the
State declares that it is legitimate to differentiate between their commitments and the com-
mitments of heterosexual couples." Id. at 226-27. Continued the ChiefJustice: "Ultimately,
the message is that what same-sex couples have is not as important or as significant as 'real'
marriage .... ." Id.
98. Law, supra note 18, at 196.
99. Id.
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unions are less worthy, less stable, and less valid than their heterosex-
ual counterparts.100 Like social systems of domination along lines of
race and gender, rigid sexual hierarchies stigmatize gay men and les-
bians: an individual's sexual orientation eventually overshadows all as-
pects of a person's identity. 10 1 When homosexuals disclose their
relationships, others are likely to view them as gay and treat them in
accordance with those stereotypes they seek to avoid. The Price
Waterhouse-Looking Glass thus suggests that the challenge might be
concerned less with establishing an explicit right to marry than with
dismantling an overt social system of oppression and subordination.
B. Adoption
Adoption is an important part of life for many homosexuals, but,
like marriage, presents an insidious Catch 22. As human beings, many
gay men and lesbians want to experience the joys of parenting. Often
this must come through adoption. 0 2 Generally, courts hearing adop-
tion cases apply the "best interests of the child" standard,10 3 often to
effectively proscribe adoption options for gay men and lesbians.' 0 4
States such as Florida, Mississippi, and Utah statutorily prohibit adop-
tion by gays and lesbians. t0 5 Most, if not all, states that refuse homo-
100. See In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 571 (Mass. 2004).
101. At least one scholar concludes that race eventually eclipses all aspects of a per-
son's identity and becomes all that anyone sees. Lenhardt, supra note 93, at 819 ("Race
becomes a sort of mask, a barrier that both makes it impossible for the stigmatized person's
true self to be seen and fixes the range of responses that others will have to that person.").
A large body of scholarship links the synergistic relationship between racism and
homophobia, including their effects. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexu-
alization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REv.
1, 15 (1999) (arguing that despite the similarities between racism and homophobia, anti-
racist legal theorists have failed to challenge heterosexist oppression).
102. Homosexuals may also seek assistive reproductive techniques. For a discussion on
this topic, see John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 323 (2004).
103. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 71-90 (1996); see
alsoJane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and Second-Par-
ent Adoption, 75 CHL-KENT L. REv. 933, 936 (2000) (noting that adoption law most often
requires a judicial determination that the adoption would be in the best interests of the
child).
104. See generally Christopher Carnahan, Inscribing Lesbian and Gay Identities: How Judi-
cial Imaginations Intertwine with the Best Interests of Children, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 1
(2004) (arguing that a variety ofjudicial decisions unfairly portray gay men and lesbians to
find their lifestyle not in the best interests of children).
105. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2003) (prohibiting adoption by a "homosexual"); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2003) (prohibiting adoption by couples of the same gender);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3) (b) (2003) (prohibiting adoption by unmarried individuals
residing with, and sexually involved with, another person). A state trial court in Florida
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sexual adoption, whether by court decision or statute, assume gay and
lesbian parents cause enormous harm.10 6
A recent case from Florida illustrates a stark reality for many gay
men and lesbians who wish to start a family.' 0 7 The applicable Florida
statute explicitly states, "No person eligible to adopt under this statute
may adopt if that person is a homosexual."' 0 8 In 1999, Steven Lofton,
Douglas Houghton, and other gay foster parents sued to make their
parental rights permanent for children under their care.1 0 9 A regis-
tered nurse, Lofton raised three HIV-positive children for over ten
years. 110 The Children's Home Society awarded Lofton the Outstand-
ing Foster Parenting award for his extraordinary care of these chil-
dren.1 1" ' Lofton submitted an adoption application for one of the
children, but, as a homosexual, was automatically denied.
1 12
Houghton, a registered nurse like Lofton, fostered one child.1 1 3
Houghton became the legal guardian after the child's father, an un-
employed alcoholic, deserted the four-year-old boy.1 14 Houghton de-
cided to adopt the child, but the state refused to grant a favorable
evaluation of him because of his homosexuality.1 5 The Florida statute
thus precluded Houghton's adoption of the child.'
1 6
Denied their right to adopt, the parents challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Florida law.1 17 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, however, upheld the law under an equal
recently ruled the adoption ban unconstitutional, but the state Attorney General filed a
notice of appeal. Yolanne Almanzar, Florida Gay Adoption Ban is Ruled Unconstitutional, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 26, 2008, at A21. The case will likely end up before the Florida Supreme Court.
Id.
106. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997
U. ILL. L. REv. 833, 853-55 (1997) (arguing that homosexual parents cause emotional
harm to their children by increasing the likelihood of homosexual interest, lowering self
images of masculinity in boys raised by lesbians, and increasing symptoms of stress and
defensive behavior).
107. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff'd, Lofton v. Sec'y of
the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
108. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2003). In 1977, Florida became the first state to prohibit
homosexuals from adopting, and is currently the only state that explicitly retains this pro-
hibition. See Eskridge, supra note 91, at 950-51.
109. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1376.
110. Id. at 1375.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1376.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1377.
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protection analysis. 118 Though the court adopted a rational basis stan-
dard of review for homosexual classifications,1 19 it rejected the state's
first justification for the law. 120 The state did not have a legitimate
interest in the moral disapproval of homosexuality: "[T]he govern-
ment cannot merely justify singling out a group of citizens for disfavor
simply because it morally disapproves of them."1121
The state, however, also argued its interest to have children
"raised in a home stabilized by marriage, in a family consisting of both
a mother and father."122 The court determined that denying gay men
and lesbians adoption rights was rationally related to this interest and
upheld the provision. 123 By legitimizing the state's stabilized family ar-
gument, the court insinuated that homosexuals are emphatically
unstable.
To uphold the ruling, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals sub-
scribed to the state of Florida's arguments against gay and lesbian
adoption.124 Though the state could not provide evidence to support
its conclusion that children best benefit from a mother and a father,
the court determined it to be an "unprovable assumption" that never-
theless surmised a rational basis to prevent gay and lesbian adop-
tion. 125 More still, the court concluded single heterosexual parents
make better parents than similarly situated homosexual parents:
"[T] he legislature could rationally act on the theory that heterosexual
singles, even if they never marry, are better positioned than homosex-
ual individuals to provide adopted children with education and gui-
dance relative to their sexual development throughout pubescence
and adolescence."'126 The court provided judicial effect to the state's
argument that gay and lesbian parents are unable to adequately pro-
vide such guidance. 127 In fact, the court accepted the belief that gay
118. Id. at 1385. The court also upheld the law on substantive due process grounds. Id.
at 1380.
119. Id. at 1382.
120. Id. at 1382-83.
121. Id. at 1383.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1384.
124. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir.
2004).
125. Id. at 819-20.
126. Id. at 822.
127. Id. at 823 (concluding the legislature could rationally rely on the assumption that
gays and lesbians are unable to educate or guide children concerning relationships with
the opposite sex); see also Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't. of Children & Family Services, 377
F.3d 1275, 1276 (11th Cir. 2004) (Birch, J., concurring in the denial of en banc review)
("Can it be seriously contended that an arguably rational basis does not exist for placing
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and lesbian parents are unable to relate to heterosexuals and, there-
fore, cannot assist heterosexual children to hetero adulthood.1 28
State laws that exclude gays and lesbians from adopting children,
like laws against same-sex marriage, impose an unfortunate double
bind. One noted scholar concludes that rearing children psychologi-
cally affects parents.1 29 That is, new parents experience a psychologi-
cal shift in self that comes with parenthood. 130 For instance, new
fathers identify increased feelings of responsibility for their families,
both financially and in caregiving. Within months, new parents often
relax socially and become less selfish.' 3 ' One mother emphatically
stated: "Becoming a mother changed every fiber, every feeling, and
every relationship for me. I am constantly in the process of evaluating,
recognizing, and repudiating the upheaval of motherhood."'132 Thus,
research proves the child rearing experience fosters dramatic in-
creases in maturity and stability within parents.
The eradication of discriminatory laws that prevent gays and les-
bians from adopting would encourage stability and maturity within
homosexual parents. Research indicates that forty-one percent of gay
and lesbian parents raising children have been together five years or
longer as compared to twenty percent of unmarried heterosexual
couples.133 The normalization of gay and lesbian adoption would
likely lead to less promiscuity and would promote fidelity in homosex-
adoptive children in the mainstream of American family life? And that to do so is irrational?
I think not."); Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: Children and Bans on Interracial Unions
and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FoP.DHAM L. REv. 2733, 2758 n.109 (2008) (noting that the Lof-
ton court deemed rational the argument that heterosexual parents are better suited to
provide sexual development guidance to children).
128. Ball, supra note 127, at 2758 n.109.
129. ANNE-MARIE AMBERT, THE EFFECT OF CHILDREN ON PARENTS 13 (2001) (noting that
children do impact their parents, which is a way of thinking neglected in most
scholarship).
130. CAROLYN COWAN & PHILIP COWAN, WHEN PARTNERS BECOME PARENTS 78-79
(1992).
131. Id. One male parent commented:
Well, it's not that I look in the mirror every morning wondering who's looking
back. It's still me. But I'm different since Zak was born. I'm more aggressive in
recruiting new business for my consulting firm. I'm more organized at work and
at home. But I'm also loosening up a little socially; I even enjoy a party every now
and then-I hated them before. I'm enjoying being a father. I'd recommend it to
anybody.
Id.
132. Toni C. Antonucci & Karen Mikus, The Power of Parenthood: Personality and Attitudi-
nal Changes During the Transition to Parenthood, in THE TRANSITION TO PARENTHOOD: CUR-
RENT THEORY AND RESEARCH 62, 62 (Gerald Michaels & Wendy Goldberg eds., 1988).
133. SeeJames G. Pawelski et al., The Effects of Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Partner-
ship Laws on the Health and Well-Being of Children, 188 PEDIATRICS 349, 351 (2006).
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ual relationships,1 34 just as adoption does in heterosexual relation-
ships. 135 Therefore, laws that prohibit adoption by homosexuals place
gays and lesbians into an intolerable double bind-criticized for their
inability to maintain family relationships but legally unable to enter
such settings.
Under a Price Waterhouse-Looking Glass, exposing such an unfair
Catch 22 again reveals irrational stereotypes and anti-homosexual
rhetoric. 136 For instance, the Lofton court implicitly concludes hetero-
sexual singles have a greater probability of establishing married
households and stable environments' 37 Though this is partly due to
Florida's refusal to recognize same-sex couples, it no doubt insinuates
gays and lesbians are unable to form lasting relationships. That is, as
sexual deviates and unnatural individuals, homosexuals offer only in-
stability and cannot relate to the superior heterosexual majority. 138
134. Richard E. Redding, It's Really Aout Sex: Same-Sex Marriage, Lesbigay Parenting, and
the Psychology of Disgust, 15 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 127, 165 (2008).
135. Gregory M. Herek, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in the United States: A
Social Science Perspective, 61 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 607, 615 (2006) (citing research studies that
show that "[b]y creating barriers and constraints on dissolving the relationship, marriage
can be a source of relationship stability and commitment").
136. See Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Mooie, C.J., concurring). Chief
Justice Moore stated emphatically:
Homosexual conduct is, and has been, considered abhorrent, immoral, detesta-
ble, a crime against nature, and a violation of the laws of nature and of nature's
God upon which this Nation and our laws are predicated. Such conduct violates
both the criminal and civil laws of this State and is destructive to a basic building
block of society-the family. The law of Alabama is not only clear in its condemn-
ing such conduct, but the courts of the State have consistently held that exposing
a child to such behavior has a destructive and seriously detrimental effect on the
children. It is an inherent evil against which children must be protected.
Id. He thus accepted the unfair stereotype that gay relationships are inherently evil and a
threat to society.
137. See Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 822
(11 th Cir. 2004). The Alabama Supreme Court similarly found that allowing a gay or les-
bian parent to raise a child might deprive the child of " ' extremely valuable developmental
experience and the opportunity for optimal individual growth and interpersonal develop-
ment.'" Ex ParteJ.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (qudting Lynn D. Wardle, The
Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 833, 895 (1997)); see
also id. ("'[T]he degree of harm to children ftrom the homosexual conduct of a person is
uncertain [,] ... and the range of poteritial harm is enormous.'" (quoting Wardle, supra, at
895)).
138. The Lofton court noted:
It is in the best interests of a child if his or her parents can personally relate to the
child's problems and assist the child in the difficult transition to heterosexual
adulthood .... [lilt is perhaps more important for adopted children than other
children to have a stable heterosexual household during puberty and the teenage
years.
Lofton, 358 F.3d at 822.
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Thus, gay men and lesbians are presumed unfit to raise chil-
dren. 13 9
Removed from rationality, such negative assumptions are used to
perpetuate a heterosexist society and oppress gay men and lesbians.
Consider that the Alabama Supreme Court, in Ex parte H.H.,140 used
negative gay stereotypes to rule against awarding custody to a child's
lesbian mother, even where individualized evidence of physical abuse
by the father was present.1 41 The court refused to compare the harm
of assault and the potential harm of indirect exposure to homosexual
conduct, though both were illegal in Alabama at the time the opinion
was finalized.' 42 Assault, however, subjects children to physical harm.
The court's decision to award custody to an alleged heterosexual child
abuser over an otherwise fit lesbian parent, without weighing the evi-
dence, thus offers explicit evidence of a heterosexist agenda used to
prejudice gay men and lesbians. 143
Such overt subordination negatively impacts the daily lives of gay
men and lesbians. 144 Because many minority groups are accustomed
to societal exclusion and often experience high rates of discrimina-
tion, their members often internalize society's disapproval and suffer
feelings of inadequacy and self-loathing.' 45 Scholars refer to these
feelings within homosexuals as "internalized homophobia," that ac-
company the stigma associated with being identified as gay or les-
139. A body of legal scholarship rebuts such negative stereotypes. See Carlos Ball &
Janice Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U.
ILL. L. REv. 253, 256 (1998) (arguing that "the law should evaluate the parenting skills of
gay and lesbian litigants individually, without relying on stereotypes gleaned from their
sexual orientation or relationships"); Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by
Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspective, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 191, 191
(1995) (presenting social science research that confirms that children of lesbian and gay
parents develop as successfully as children of heterosexual parents).
140. 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002).
141. Id. at 23 (discussing evidence that the father slapped his son, causing his nose to
bleed, and whipped his children with a belt).
142. ChiefJustice Moore's opinion was written prior to Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), which called into question the constitutionality of Alabama's sodomy statute. Id. at
562.
143. Chief Justice Moore cannot, in fact, identify any specific harm to the children
living with a lesbian mother, nor does he use any psychological mechanism to explain how
future harm might occur. See Carnahan, supra note 104, at 10-11. Because he chose to
overlook possible future physical harm that might result from the children living with their
father, his opinion reflects more upon the stereotypes and assumptions used to
subordinate homosexuals than it does the best interests of the children. Id.
144. See Eskridge, supra note 91, at 955 (arguing that public law shapes the daily lives of
gay men and lesbians).
145. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Forward: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. Rv. 1, 6-7 (1977).
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bian.146  This internalization can lead to lowered self-esteem,
depression, and increased rates of suicide.' 47 In addition, laws that
prohibit gay men and lesbians from adopting children cause homo-
sexuals to fixate on their sexual identity to the exclusion of other as-
pects of their personality. 148
Feelings of negative self-image are not unique to homosexuals. In
fact, Hopkins also experienced such pernicious feelings when re-
minded of her status as a woman.' 49 Sociologists find that "most vic-
tims of stigma . . . tend to accept the version of their identities
imposed by the stigma.' 1 50 Stigmatized classes can experience ex-
treme uncertainty which causes the group to question their ability to
fit in with the rest of society and may cause them to view problems and
frustrations as resulting from their stigmatized status.' 5 1 This, in turn,
leads to lessened personal and professional achievement. 152 Viewed
under the Price Waterhouse-Looking Glass, the prohibition on gay
adoption thus reveals yet another legal mechanism used to uphold a
social system of oppression against gay men and lesbians.
C. The Gay Male Blood Ban
Outside of the family context, the federal policy preventing gay
men from donating blood presents yet another form of prejudice. As
a general rule, anyone over the age of seventeen, who weighs at least
110 pounds, and is in good health may donate blood. 53 An exception
to this rule, however, prevents many gay men from donating. "Under
a 15-year-old policy, all male blood donors are asked if they have had
146. See Michael W. Ross & B.R. Simon Rosser, Measurement and Correlates ofInternalized
Homophobia: A Factor Analytic Study, 52J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 15 (1996).
147. See id.; see also Redding, supra note 134, at 164 (concluding that gays and lesbians
have higher rates of depression, anxiety, and substance abuse than the general population,
due in part to the effects of stigma and prejudice).
148. See Redding, supra note 134, at 164 (noting that it would be surprising if gay men
and lesbians did not suffer from an impaired self image and some degree of unhappiness
with their stigmatized status).
149. HOPKINS, supra note 27, at 44 ("[S]even months [into my pregnancy], I had to
deal with the humiliation of trying to buy maternity clothes .... [People] think because
I've lost my shape, I've lost my mind.").
150. Karst, supra note 145, at 7 (concluding that stigma victims feel less valued by soci-
ety than those who are granted full legal rights).
151. See Gregory M. Walton & Geoffrey L. Cohen, A Question of Belonging: Racial, Social
Fit, and Achievement, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 82 (2007).
152. Id. at 94.
153. New York Blood Center, Who Can Give Blood, http://www.nybloodcenter.org/
whocangiveblood/index.do?sidO=2&sidl=16&page-id=18 (last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
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sex, even once, with another man since 1977."154 If a donor answers
yes, he is sent home and entered on a national deferral database of
people banned from donating for life.155 Though "[d]onating blood
is one of the few things we can all do to directly help another human
being,"1 56 this policy eliminates gay men from the pool of eligible do-
nors regardless of their promiscuity or sexual behavior.
In 1981, the first instances of the Adult Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome ("AIDS") outbreak were observed in homosexual men. Clus-
ters of young and generally healthy men began to develop cases of a
rare disease from unexplained causes. "The fact that homosexual men
constituted the initial population in which AIDS occurred in the
United States led some to surmise that a homosexual lifestyle was spe-
cifically related to the disease." 157 One 1981 federal government study
of 116 homosexual patients with immune deficiency related illnesses
concluded the patients were sexually promiscuous, each having an av-
erage of 1100 sexual contacts.' 58
By 1982, epidemiologists suspected that blood and sexual fluids
transmitted whatever caused AIDS. 159 The nation's blood supply,
therefore, posed a major vector for the disease.' 60 In response, the
Center for Disease Control ("CDC") hosted a meeting where it sup-
ported donor deferral guidelines.161 Suspected high-risk groups, spe-
cifically gay men, were asked to refrain from donating blood. 162
154. Christopher Heredia, Panel Upholds Ban on Gays Giving Blood; Advisers to FDA Call
Risk of AIDS Too Great, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 15, 2000, at Al.
155. FDA Plans to Review Ban of Gay Male Blood Donors, TIMES UNION (Albany), Sept. 11,
2000, at A2.
156. Belli, supra note 11, at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. NAT'L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, THE RE-
LATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS AND ACQUIRED IMMU-
NODEFICIENCY SYNDROME, http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/topics/HIVAIDS/Understanding/
How+HIV+Causes+AIDS/relationshipHIVADS.htn (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
158. Robin Marantz Henig, AIDS: A New Disease's Deadly Odyssey, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
1983, at 28.
159. See Francis A. Hochberg, HIV/AIDS Blood Donation Policies: A Comparative Study of
Public Health Policies and Individual Rights Norms, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 231, 243-44
(2002); see also Belli, supra note 11, at 330 (documenting a theory that overexposure to
sperm might cause HIV infection).
160. Harvey M. Sapolsky & Stephen L. Boswell, The History of Transfusion AIDS: Practice
and Policy Alternatives, in AIDS: THE MAKING OF A CHRONIC DISEASE 170, 172 (Elizabeth Fee
& Daniel M. Fox eds., 1992).
161. See Adam Pulver, Gay Blood Revisionism: A Critical Analysis of Advocacy and the "Gay
Blood Ban," 17 LAw & SEXUALITY 107, 111 (2008).
162. See RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS
EPIDEMIC 170 (1987). The CDC has no regulatory power, but provides epidemiologic infor-
mation and support to regulatory agencies, medical providers, and the public. Sherry
Glied, Markets Matter: U.S. Responses to the HIV-Infected Blood Tragedy, 82 VA. L. REV. 1493,
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Opposition to the CDC proposal was widespread, as many feared be-
ing labeled with the stigma of a gay disease.' 63 The CDC, therefore,
adopted a wait-and-see approach. 164
After two confirmed cases of transfusion AIDS were reported in
New York and San Francisco, t 65 in 1983, the CDC again urged some
method of screening the blood donor pool. 166 Gay groups vehemently
opposed screening, describing the proposal as "scapegoating homo-
sexuals,""'reminiscent of miscegenation blood laws that divided black
blood from white."'167 Nevertheless, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion ("FDA") issued non-mandatory guidelines, urging groups at in-
creased risk for AIDS to refrain from donating blood.168 The policy
included gay men who were sexually active with multiple partners, had
"overt symptoms of immune deficiency," or previously engaged in sex-
ual relations with men who now did.' 69 The policy was revised
throughout 1984, and gay community groups grudgingly accepted the
now mandatory policy with the understanding that once an AIDS test
was developed, the screening would stop.170 Although a reliable test
for the AIDS virus was developed in 1985,171 the FDA sought to per-
manently exclude sexually active gay men from the blood donor
pool.
1 7 2
The FDA has reconsidered the gay male blood deferral policy
only twice. 173 In September 2000, the Blood Products Advisory Com-
mittee considered altering the lifetime ban for gay men to a five-year
deferral from the time of last male-to-male contact. 174 Ultimately, the
1495 (1996). The CDC relies on the FDA and Public Health Service agencies to implement
its recommendations. Id. at 1495-96.
163. See id. at 1496.
164. See SHILTS, supra note 162, at 171.
165. See Epidemiologic Notes and Reports Possible Transfusion-Associated Acquired Immune De-
ficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-California, M.M.W.R. (Ctr. for Disease Control, Atlanta, Ga.), Dec.
10, 1982, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00O01203.htm.
166. See Pulver, supra note 161, at 112.
167. SHILTs, supra note 162, at 220 (quoting Pat Norman, Chair of the San Francisco
Coordinating Committee of Gay and Lesbian Services).
168. RONALD BAYER, PRIVATE Acrs, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 85 (1989).
169. SHILTS, supra note 162, at 242-43.
170. See BAYER, supra note 168, at 86.
171. Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REv. 1695, 1708 (1993).
172. See Hochberg, supra note 159, at 247-48.
173. See Pulver, supra note 161, at 118; see also generally U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion, Blood Products Advisory Committee Meeting, March 15-16, 2001, http://www.fda.
gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/cber0l.htm#Blood%Products (collecting documents from the
2001 meeting).
174. Derek Lind, Should Gay Men Be Allowed to Donate Blood?, GAY MEN'S HEALTH CRISIS,
Nov./Dec. 2000, http://www.thebody.com/content/art3321.htm1.
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move failed once the American Red Cross came out in opposition to
any such change. 175 The FDA thus continues to view gay men as a
biological threat and prohibits their blood donations. 176
The Price Waterhouse--Looking Glass reveals another instance of
the pernicious Catch 22. Our laws create a legal barrier of entry to
prevent gay men and lesbians from same-sex marriage and adoption
due to their perceived promiscuity and inability to develop or main-
tain long-term relationships. 177 Hence, gay men and lesbians often
participate in less lengthy and more frequent relationships. 178 At the
same time, the FDA excludes gay male blood as dirty and unsafe. Our
laws therefore punish gay men and lesbians for promiscuity yet restrict
their ability to form monogamous and stable relationships. These
laws, combined, force inconsistent demands on gay men and lesbians
that Price Waterhouse ruled discriminatory. 179
The law thus punishes the promiscuous homosexual, yet prevents
gay men and lesbians from forming lasting relationships that maintain
stability. So, again, which is it? Can gay men and lesbians form com-
mitted and stable relationships, or should homosexuals accept their
exclusion from such relationships to enjoy less committed and punish-
able lifestyles? Just as Ann Hopkins felt oppression through inconsis-
tent demands, gay men and lesbians also feel inconsistent pressures to
lead both promiscuous and monogamous lives.
Here too, the law employs an irrational Catch 22 to subordinate
homosexuals in a heterosexist society. One commentator noted that
AIDS offered society an opportunity to propagate the belief that ho-
mosexuality was itself a disease and a threat to human survival.180 The
175. The committee cited uncertainty in the scientific evidence about the efficacy of
blood testing procedures. Another factor in the failed attempt to amend the policy
stemmed from the fact that, by age forty, human herpes virus-8, an indicator of unpro-
tected sexual activity trends, infects one third of gay men in the United States. See FD.A.
Panel Rejects Bid to Ease Ban on Blood Donations by Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000, at A29.
176. Though the Red Cross silently reversed its stance in 2005 to support a one-year
deferral period for sexually active gay men, the most recent consideration again failed. See
Rob Stein, FDA to Review Ban on Gay Men Donating Blood, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2006, at A06;
see also Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, FDA
Workshop on Behavior-Based Donor Deferrals in the NAT Era http://www.fda.gov/cber/
minutes/nat030806t.pdf (Mar. 8, 2006) (workshop minutes).
177. See Wilson, supra note 84, at 661 (noting that many people oppose gay marriage
due to a perceived increased risk of sexually transmitted diseases).
178. See Redding, supra note 134, at 162 (noting that homosexuals do have higher rates
of promiscuity and non-monogamy than heterosexuals).
179. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
180. Richard Poirier, AIDS and Traditions of Homophobia, 55 Soc. RES. 461, 463-64
(1988).
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antibody test became a mechanism to identify and exclude gay men
from various other parts of society. The United States military, for ex-
ample, began mass HIV testing of all recruits and active duty person-
nel.18 ' Those who tested positive were rejected for service and often
informed of their HIV status without counseling or information about
the disease.18 2 In 1987, Congress passed the Helms Amendment
which forbade the use of any CDC funds "to provide AIDS education,
information, or prevention materials and activities that promote or
encourage, directly, homosexual sexual activities.' 1 83 The AIDS stigma
has since proven nearly unstoppable.
A significant shift in AIDS infection rates offers additional evi-
dence that this policy is unfair and used only to effectuate a heterosex-
ist social system. In the 1980s, the public perceived AIDS as a disease
of gay men, a perception that led to the FDA policy.184 More recenty,
however, research has documented AIDS seroprevalence among ho-
mosexual men at only eight percent.18 5 Early in the AIDS epidemic,
women were portrayed as either absent from the disease or victims of
bisexual male partners.' 8 6 By 1990, however, more women were diag-
nosed with AIDS than men, 87 and AIDS was the leading cause of
death for African American women between the ages of 15 and 44.18
The risk is also heavily skewed by economic class as enormously high
infection rates correlate to poverty.' 8 9 One scholar concludes that in-
fection rates among the poor and women of color have reached "epi-
demic proportions."190
181. Id. at 1708 n.54.
182. Id. Military use of the test was soon followed by adoption of mandatory testing
programs by the Foreign Service and the Job Corps. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dep't
of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987) (rejecting an injunction against the Foreign Ser-
vice's mandatory AIDS testing).
183. United States Institute of Peace Act, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 514(a), 101 Stat. 1329-
287, 1329-289 (1987).
184. See NAN D. HUNTER & WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, AIDS AGENDA: EMERGING ISSUES IN
CIVIL RIGHTS 3 (1994).
185. See Hochberg, supra note 159, at 249.
186. Id. at 6-7 (noting that women were primarily depicted as vectors of transmission).
187. Id. at 5. AIDS also became one of the five leading causes of death for all women
between the ages of 15 and 44. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 6 (noting that intravenous drug use dramatically increases the risk of infec-
tion, and is commonly associated with poverty).
190. Id. According to a New York Times article:
There is the inner-city epidemic, the rural epidemic, the epidemic among wo-
men, among intravenous drug users, among gay men, among blacks, among non-
Hispanic whites and among Hispanics. But the most powerful determinant of how
an HIV patient fares is not race or gender or sexual orientation .... It is class. In
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The FDA does not, however, ban African American women or
individuals living in poverty from donating blood. Hence, if the FDA
excluded societal classes from donating based on higher infection
rates, current facts establish that gay men should not represent the
only affected group. 191 Gay men excluded under this substantially
over- and under-inclusive policy are, therefore, placed into second-
class status.
Such oppression may prove particularly severe on gay men and
lesbians because their exclusion from the institutions of marriage,
adoption, and blood donation is state sponsored. Courts recognize
that when governments bring the full weight of their power down
onto a disadvantaged class, the resultant stigma can be more crushing
than that arising from private discrimination. 92 As a result, laws that
exclude homosexuals through unfair stereotypes allow private individ-
uals to treat homosexuals in accordance with associated sexual orien-
tation stereotypes.
Additionally, state-sponsored exclusion or discrimination invites
private discrimination. The Supreme Court recognized that the
criminalization of sexual intimacy between same-sex persons was "an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the
public and in the private spheres."1 9 3 Thus, excluding gay men and
lesbians from traditional public institutions can lead to further private
prejudice.
Conclusion
Stereotypes subordinate, and the Catch 22 represents a powerful
vehicle to enforce such oppression of the minority. Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins recognized for the first time that women are often caught in
the middle of two opposing female gender stereotypes. The Supreme
Court, in ruling for Ann Hopkins, concluded that society should treat
that respect there are just two epidemics: the one among people who, by virtue of
their education and income, lead stable lives and the one among people who do
not.
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In AIDS War, New Weapons and New Victims, N.Y. TIMES,June 3, 2001, at
A24.
191. See Hochberg, supra note 159, at 248 (noting that many scientists believe that the
measures have not satisfied the FDA's goal of specifically targeting high risk behaviors
rather than stereotypes).
192. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); see also Lewis v. Harris, 908
A.2d 196, 226 (N.J. 2006) ("By excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage, the State
declares that it is legitimate to differentiate between their commitments and the commit-
ments of heterosexual couples.").
193. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
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women and men as individuals, not as members of a sexually deter-
mined class. Price Waterhouse thus represents a formal legal rejection of
an ideology that women accept exclusion and subservience in public
and economic life. 194 As such, the Price Waterhouse-Looking Glass of-
fers a unique method to reveal arbitrary stereotypes and to decon-
struct ideological manifestations of oppression.
In Bowers, the Supreme Court approved the use of unfair stereo-
types and reinforced cultural discrimination against, and ostracism of,
homosexuals. 195 Though Bowers was eventually overturned, this Com-
ment has attempted to show that the law continues to play an impor-
tant role in expressing and reinforcing heteronormativity. 196 The
three legal regimes I describe-same-sex marriage, homosexual adop-
tion, and the gay male blood ban-rest on unjust generalizations that
deprive gay men and lesbians of individual liberty and equal per-
sonhood. Such similar double binds fly in the face of what Price
Waterhouse ruled discriminatory. That is, these policies punish gay men
and lesbians for their instability and prohibit actual stability.
At least one scholar has argued that heterosexism relates to a
broader social system of subordination through race, class, gender,
and sexuality. 19 7 Used here, the Price Waterhouse-Looking Glass decon-
structs three axes of overt subordination to reveal only irrational ste-
reotypes. It demonstrates that indiscriminate means of social
domination continue to exist. The everyday lives of gay men and lesbi-
ans experience prejudice under rigid sexuality hierarchies and under
a social system used to stigmatize their non-heterosexual identities
and practices.
I seek to remind legal advocates and scholars that our nation
made a commitment to protect human equality for all. 198 We should
194. See Law, supra note 18, at 206-07 (1988) (noting that, for centuries, women ac-
cepted exclusion and subservience in public and economic life, and state control of their
reproductive capacity).
195. See id. at 194 (concluding that the Bowers decision reinforced silence and isolation,
which breed negative stereotypes and prejudice).
196. One scholar defines "heteronormativity" as "both those localized practices and
those centralized institutions which legitimize and privilege heterosexuality and heterosex-
ual relationships as fundamental and 'natural' within society." Cathy J. Cohen, Punks,
Buldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics?, 3 GLQ 437, 440
(1997), available at http://glq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/3/4/437.
197. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Dissecting Axes of Subordination: The Need for a Struc-
tural Analysis, 11 Am. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'v & L. 13, 14 (2002) (discussing how a struc-
tural analysis ofjudicial bias can uncover subtle, hidden, and ideological manifestations of
oppression).
198. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also Derek W. Black, The Contradiction Between
Equal Protection's Meaning and Its Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15
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subscribe to the idea that "all human beings are precious, deserving of
respect and support, and that the worth of all human beings is
equal."'199 We must therefore remain steadfast in a mission to stamp
out irrational stereotypes and inequality wherever they may arise, in-
cluding with regard to sexual orientation.
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 562 (2006) (concluding that equal protection can be re-
duced to one fundamental concept-that "all are equally entitled to the consideration and
protection of the law").
199. Martha C. Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities: "Perception" Against Lofty Formal-
ism, 121 HARv. L. REv. 4, 10 (2006).
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